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THE Anglo-American oil agreement was a tardy and groping expres-
sion of the wish of the American government to assure the adequacy
of our future oil supplies. Twice attempts were made to achieve this
end by independent national action. Only after they failed did thought
turn towards an international arrangement.
The reasons for our concern were plain. During the war the United
States consumed oil at a gigaitic rate--to sustain life and production
within the United States, to supply American fighting forces abroad,
and to satisfy the needs of our allies. The rate of use substantially ex-
ceeded the amount of current proven new discoveries within the
United States. Fear spread that the reserves of the United States
(and of the rest of the hemisphere) might not be sufficient for future
needs; needs which, experience showed, might be tremendous in the
event of another war. Nations that lacked oil had to bargain or barter
for it; they became dependent on the will or bounty of others; the
United States was unused to the idea. Both our security and our inde-
pendence in these hours of swift anxiety seemed threatened. The
Petroleum Administrator for War brought these fears to public atten-
tion when, with a doubting turn of phrase, he posed the direct question
as to whether we should be able to "oil another war."
Appraisals of the situation were tinged by resentment because the
resources controlled by British companies were not being drawn upon
equally; the geography and logistics of the war made it impossible to
do so. And ideas regarding our possible future need, evoked by the
experience of a navy fighting over the seven seas, became roving and
far-flung; they stretched out into a wish for certainty that there would
always be an assured and near source of supply for our ships whenever
and wherever a battle could best be fought.
In the atmosphere of sudden alarm, the reassuring aspects of our
situation were not carefully reckoned. Many prognosticators too
quickly concluded that the then current lag in new discovery within
the United States was of permanent significance. At the same time
pessimism spread in regard to the reliability of supplies drawn from the
Caribbean area. The rude expropriations of American interests that
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had taken place in Mexico and Bolivia, the attempts of Argentina to
squeeze out the American interests active there, the refusal of Brazil
to admit foreign interests, the stiffening terms asked by Colombia
and Venezuela-all these made the American industry doubtful about
the security and profitability of their ventures in Latin America. The
industry was willing to gamble mightily on the secrets of nature; it
had usually come out a winner in that game. But it lacked equanimity
in the face of governments which could, if they insisted, have the last
say on the rules.
The possibilities of synthetic production were established but not
attractive; they would require an immense new investment and the
product would be more costly.
These reckonings combined to direct attention to the one other
vast supply of oil still awaiting the drill-the Arab lands of the Middle
East. The concept of American isolation had crumbled. Upon its
ruins the idea was sprouting that, thenceforth, to be secure, the United
States would have to concern itself with the affairs of every part of the
world. The Middle East offered an attractive and effective base of
operation-economic, political and military-to minds that were feel-
ing the elation of our power. And the American oil companies already
located in that area were eager for support and assistance since they
felt themselves obstructed by circumstance and beset by risks, while
oil enterprises in other areas were pushing forward operations at a
tremendous rate.
The Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company
possessed in partnership an exclusive right to develop the most promis-
ing fields of Saudi Arabia and the smaller field located on the nearby
island of Bahrein. The Gulf Oil Company held a half partnership with
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in oil that might be produced in the
neighboring sheikdom of Kuwait, but it was restricted by an agree-
ment not to market its share of the products in countries already
served by its partner. Production in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein had
barely begun when the United States entered the war. The first period
of exploration and construction was just coming to an end, and the
assured profitable markets for this oil had up to then been small. No,,
the companies, having made considerable investment, ,,ere eager to
expand production but half afraid to do so.
They feared first of all for the safety of their concessions. This was
in part a fear that British influence would be used to sway local govern-
ments to make oppressive demands. They were also afraid that the
extension of Russian ambitions towards the Persian Gulf might disturb
or dispossess them. They feared that they might, sometime or other,
become involved in local disputes over political power-not vith Ibn
Saud who had granted the concessions, but with his heirs or rivals.
They feared that they might not be able to sell profitably large quan-
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tities of production in competition with other Middle Eastern pro-
ducers-especially in foreign markets subject to exchange control or
discriminatory restrictions. Finally, they feared that if oil production
did not bring large enough royalties to local sovereigns, incalculably
large advances would be demanded of them.
By the American government, disturbed over the future oil outlook,
the continuance of American control over these Middle Eastern con-
cessions was now accepted as vital. During war, only those sources of
supply which were under complete command, economic and military,
seemed certain and satisfactory. The question of whether and how the
United States could be certain of retaining control of, and access to,
Middle Eastern sources of supply under the circumstances of future
emergency was not fully explored. That would depend on who our
friends and enemies turned out to be, where the fighting was, and what
the weapons. Judgment took the customary route of national calcula-
tion that the retention of American control was a clearly advisable
precaution; there would be time later to figure out how these oil fields
could be protected and used in the event of war.
Furthermore, the Middle Eastern oil fields could immediately serve
our armed forces in the Pacific, saving time and transport, and lessen-
ing the current drain on the reserves of this hemisphere. They could
become a permanent source of supply to American (and possibly for-
eign) oil companies 6ngaged in distribution in the Far East, the Medi-
terranean, and Europe, thus reducing the future rate of use of Ameri-
can reserves. These fields could also be an ample and cheap provider
for our navy and air force during peace time. It therefore was judged
clearly advantageous, if not essential, to hasten the expansion of pro-
duction in all the Middle Eastern oil areas.
About the time these ideas matured in official circles, American oil
companies without Middle Eastern oil holdings sought to crowd in
next to the established enterprises--as usually happens when a great
new oil region is discovered within the United States. Two large com-
panies sent representatives to Iran to bid for concessions in the sections
of that country not included in the Anglo-Iranian concession, while
others probed Egypt. And the American partners in the Iraq Petroleum
Company (with large production in Iraq) persuaded their foreign part-
ners (who took little persuasion) to hurry with plans for a second pipe-
line to the Mediterranean. All these activities were favorably regarded
by the United States as contributing towards adequate supply during
the war and thereafter.
THE FIRST ATTEMPTED MEASURES
These circumstances and purposes prompted the American govern-
ment in the years 1943-44 to make two bold and independent attempts
to assure the American oil position in the Middle East.
4
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It tried first to buy the capitalstock of the Arabian-American Com-
pany (which owns the concessions for Saudi Arabia) and the Bahrein
Petroleum Company (which owns the concessions for Bahrein). The
parent American oil companies refused to sell.
Next it entered into an agreement with these companies whereby
the government undertook to construct a pipe-line from the main
proven fields along the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. This pipe-
line would have substantially reduced the cost of transport, and thereby
enabled Arabian oil to compete in the markets of Europe and the
Mediterranean with oil from other parts of the Middle East and the
'Western hemisphere. This project also was defeated. Liberals con-
demned it as a dangerous, if not a sinister, leap into imperialism. Iso-
lationists condemned it as placing the American government in the
middle of the struggle between the British Empire and the U.S.S.R.
for dominance in the Middle East.
And most decisive of all, virtually all sections of the American oil
industry rose up in protest. Neither measured in their views nor
restrained in their expressions, they united in opposition to an ar-
rangement which, according to their expressed belief, might place
the government in competition with them all, everywhere. The do-
mestic producers feared that the step might prepare the way for an
increased importation of oil into the United States. The American oil
companies engaged in production in the Caribbean (who then were
spending great new sums to expand production) feared that it would
mean loss of foreign markets. The American participants in Iraq pro-
duction felt that the government was favoring their immediate busi-
ness rivals.
American opposition was so vocal and vigorous that foreign interests
and governments did not have to indicate their attitudes. They were
free to sit by and marvel at the exuberance of our internal row. The
project was permitted to die in an unreal international silence.
But the anxieties and alms which had impelled the American gov-
ernment's activities remained. How could continued American control
of these oil fields in the Middle East be protected? How could the
production of Middle Eastern oil be rapidly increased? How could
fair and equal opportunity for American oil enterprise in those parts
of the Middle East still open to search be assured? The government
remained unwilling to trust to ordinary economic incentives and the
usual forms of diplomatic protection.
THE AEmCAN APPROACH TO THE AGREEmENT
After the failure of national action, the thought took root that the
situation and future prospects could be managed by international
agreement. The United States, whose nationals held a commanding
place in oil development and possessed great resources, had much to
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offer other nations, and nothing that it sought could be fairly judged
as harmful, unjust or threatening to them. Could not our aims and
those of others be embraced in a joint program-a program that would
simultaneously protect the future American position, avert or soften
rivalries, and reconcile the interests of producing and dependent
countries?
Such were the hopeful thoughts that shaped the first proposals for
an international agreement. The attitude of other governments was
unknown. And there lurked in the background unsettled questions of
relationship between the government and the oil companies.
The oil companies were independent and suspicious. Governments,
particularly the American government, might persuade but could not
control them. This imposed a serious limit on the obligations which
our government could accept. But in another aspect it provided a
healthy restraint. The necessity for respecting private interests might
be a safeguard against excessive or unfair foreign demands. There
was a genuine risk in inviting undisciplined national governments
to intervene in this vast international activity. If they were unscru-
pulous and at odds with one another, they might chain or smash
it. They were, on the whole, more likely to quarrel than the oil com-
panies and less likely to compromise. What was wanted of national
governments was a firm promise that they would behave reasonably
and decently if the oil companies did.
It seemed advisable to move with caution. The best way to find out
what kind of international agreement, if any, was possible seemed to
be to discuss the matter first with the country whose interest in oil
seemed most similar to that of the United States-Great Britain.
Moreover, the problems of rivalry in the Middle East, which were
then in the forefront, seemed mainly to be between us and the British.
For these reasons the attempt to formulate an international oil
agreement was restricted to discussions between the American and the
British governments. This may have been a mistake. No one will ever
know what would have happened had a more comprehensive group,
including the U.S.S.R., been invited into these first conferences.
The ideas that the American representatives upheld were a mixture
of national aims (based on the thought that the United States would
have to take care of itself) and international purposes (based on the
wish to advance the prospects of peace-economic and political). The
government wished to assure the adequacy and certainty of supplies
available to the United States; therefore it wished to safeguard the
opportunities already held by American enterprise. But it was eager
to avert dispute over the great remaining opportunities and was pre-
disposed to favor dividing them in order to avoid unlimited diplomatic
and economic contest.
The government recognized the right of each country to decide
[Vol. 55 : 11741178
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN OIL AGREEMENT
whether and on what terms to admit foreign oil enterprise within its
borders, but it was hopeful that countries could be persuaded that it
was to their advantage to open the door. It recognized the validity
of the claim of countries of source to a generous share of the economic
returns from oil produced within their borders. It favored the view
that companies engaged in the international oil business had an obliga-
tion to provide oil to all countries on equal terms.
It had no intention of using its control over supply as a weapon of
national policy in time of peace. And after the war control over oil
supply might be deemed of less military importance. The v-ar partner-
ship that was defeating the Axis would, it was hoped, continue after-
ward. In that event the need for national precaution would become
less intense, and co-operation in a collective security organization
might become the primary line of defense. It might then be possible
to contemplate the gradual establishment of international regulation
of oil operations everywhere.
II
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT
The British delegation to the conference was compact and experi-
enced. Headed by a senior civil servant, it included executive officials
of the two enormous British oil enterprises that operate in foreign lands.
There was every sign that the British government and British industry
were in agreement as to what they should seek and what they should
grant. By contrast the American delegation was very large and divided
within itself. The two senior government members (Secretary of
State and Petroleum Administrator for WVar) were not at ease with
each other. Several of the great American oil companies with foreign
interests had been invited to share in the conferences as advisers. But
as the meetings proceeded they became dissatisfied with their part.
They felt themselves treated as outsiders. Each was afraid that some
other oil interest would fare better than the one he represented, and
all were afraid that the agreement would handicap the industry rather
than help it. Despite these difficulties the main outline of an agree-
ment was eventually created, and remaining details were subsequently
settled by cable.
Not until another British delegation, headed by Lord Beaverbrook,
Lord Privy Seal in Churchill's cabinet, came to the United States to
conclude the compact did the true significance of the misunderstanding
between the American government and the American oil industry
during the conference become plain. The problems of relationship
that had remained now became manifest in open argument. The indus-
try rebelled at some of the proposed principles, fearing that it might
become subject to government dictation. It wished to be sure that it
would have an ample chance to pass judgment upon any significant
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attempt to apply the principles formulated in the accord. In the vague
language and hideously entwined construction of the text, suspicious
minds could find some justification for many fears.
These centered on three points. The first flowed from the fact that
the State Department undertook to submit the agreement to Congress
to be enacted as a Treaty. A weakly established doctrine circulates
among international lawyers to the effect that if the government as-
sumes an obligation in treaty form, it is free to ignore usual constitu-
tional restraints in its enforcement. The industry feared that the
executive branch of the government might use the vague language of
the Treaty to regulate vital activities of the American oil industry,
even the domestic activities. Sorhe elements in the industry seemed
convinced that this was the main purpose of the agreement.
The second fear of the industry was that, as an outcome of the agree-
ment, the government would restrain or interfere with foreign opera-
tions; it might intervene in the search for or development of foreign
concessions, perhaps dictate price policies, marketing arrangements
and the like. The heads of the industry did not relish the possibility of
sharing the rule of their vast empire.
The third fear was that the agreement would operate ultimately to
favor increased imports of foreign oil into the United States. Since
the original inspiration for the negotiation had been a wish to protect
future American reserves, it was deemed likely that the American
governmental representative on the International Petroleum Commis-
sion (which was to be established under the agreement) would not
resist proposals that would further open the American market to for-
eign oil. Domestic producing interests on the whole do not share the
opinion that our oil reserves will be insufficient for our future needs.
They remain confident that, if the inducement to look for and produce
oil is satisfactory, American production will long be adequate, at least
for domestic needs. At all events, they do not wish to share the Ameri-
can market unless it is more plainly necessary that they do so.
Government officials were quick to recognize that they could not
overcome this battery of fears and suspicions. The agreement was
withdrawn from the Senate. Discussions with the industry were re-
newed regarding amendments that would make the agreement accept-
able. After long and difficult argument, agreement was achieved. The
British government and oil interests readily accepted the proposed
changes. These did not lessen its possible value to them; for they left
unaffected the prospect of harmonious action in defense of existing
concessions in the Middle East and Caribbean. The revised agreement
was signed in September 1945. Shortly thereafter it was re-submitted
to the Senate.
There it languishes, half forgotten. The spasm of belief that the
international differences of various shades over oil might be adjusted
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in accordance with jointly formulated principles seems to have spent
itself for the time being. Apparently there is common consent to leave
the proposal in dull suspense, while each country and each company
proceeds with its own plans.
In part, this delay is a reflection of the change that has occurred in
the oil supply situation since 1943-44, but it probably also results from
a judgment that the agreement in its present form does not provide
means of dealing with those events most likely to disturb the inter-
national oil situation; in fact, its enactment now, especially if coupled
with new inter-governmental discussions, might increase the chances
of disturbance.
The change in the oil supply situation has been comforting. Pro-
duction within the United States and the Caribbean area is ample for
current needs, and estimates of proven reserves have been revised
upward. Production in all of the Middle Eastern fields has been ex-
panding rapidly. American companies engaged in production in Saudi
Arabia and Bahrein are greatly increasing their output, aided by navy
contracts. They are proceeding with plans to construct a pipe-line
to the Mediterranean when the commercial and political outlook
becomes more secure. The Gulf Oil Company is preparing to develop
greater production in Kuwait. In all, Middle Eastern oil is entering
into the world's supply lines in far larger proportions than before the
war. The discussions between the American and British oil companies
themselves quieted mutual suspicions. The hypothesis that they could
not work together has been superseded by a belief that they can.
Simultaneously with these pacifying changes of circumstance, signs
of possible new troubles, more serious perhaps than those visualized in
the past, have appeared. These emerge from political disputes. Oil is
not their root, and settlements having to deal merely with oil will not
dispose of them. The first arises from the struggle over Palestine which
now involves all the Arab states. The second stems from the mistrust
between the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers. No one knows how
deep this may become or what regions it may affect. Should it persist,
Middle Eastern oil may become a counter in the dangerous struggle.
The new manifestations of Russian interest in acquiring control of
oil resources outside of its boundaries have raised the question whether
an immediate effort should not be made to re-negotiate the Petroleum
Agreement as a three- or four-party agreement. This would be feasible
only if Russian aims in oil were similar to those of the United States
and Great Britain and if the U.S.S.R. were willing to leave existing
American and British interests undisturbed. Is there any chance of
arriving at a common policy with the U.S.S.R. in oil until the more
critical issues troubling the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the
Western powers are settled?
These are the main reasons for the present inaction regarding the
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American-British agreement. As it now stands the agreement is a frail
and filmy web of intention to which no country could take serious ob-
jection. Yet the agreement should be resuscitated to give clear proof
of our willingness to abide by its amicable principles. It is a first step
toward a more comprehensive and significant agreement if and when
substantial harmony is reached on more basic issues.
III
THE AGREEMENT
The reader of the agreement is at first likely to feel as though he
were walking among the spaces and angles of an abstract painting.
It is hard to identify and sort out its contents, harder still to construe
them.
The accord is bold in that it embraces oil activities not merely in the
Middle East, but throughout the whole world. This would have many
advantages, if achievable. The same general rules should be roughly
applicable to international oil activities everywhere, to the extent
that it is practicable. For one thing, oils produced in fields far distant
from each other compete for the same market; those whose interests
lie in any one particular source of supply are affected by policies and
practices pursued elsewhere. Also, disputes between competing inter-
ests for oil reserves, or disputes between foreign interests and govern-
ments within whose territory oil resources lie, may arise anywhere.
Therefore the wish to create an identical basis for the adjustment of
such rivalries and disputes, no matter where they occur, was justified.
But an agreement of universal scope may be harder to obtain than
one of regional scope; and any universal agreement obtainable is likely
to be extremely broad and general in meaning. Take for example, the
rule affirmed in the American-British agreement that "with regard to
the acquisitions of exploration and development rights the principle
of equal opportunity shall be respected." This may be satisfactory to
the countries of the Middle East but unacceptable to some other
countries in the Caribbean area, or, perhaps, China. Or take the rule
that oil should be supplied to all countries on "competitive and equal"
terms. This may be acceptable to certain companies operating in
certain regions, but not acceptable to others elsewhere, who have built
up their development plans on the basis of special contracts. For rea-
sons of this type greater flexibility in interpretation and administration
will be required, thereby accentuating one of the troublesome charac-
teristics of the accord, its lack of precision.
So vague is the agreement that it is impossible to be certain as to the
significance in practice of any of its parts. The signatories appear to
obligate themselves conclusively and directly on only two points.
These are, first, that ". . the international petroleum trade in all
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its aspects should be conducted in an orderly manner on a world-wide
basis with due regard to the considerations set forth in the preamble,
and within the framework of applicable laws and concession contracts."
The reader is left to search the text and his experience for the meaning
of this; it seems to be merely a guarded renunciation by the participants
of any intention to create disorder or disturb each other's position.
And second, the signatories agree to propose "to the governments
of all interested producing and consuming countries the negotiation
of an international oil agreement which also would establish a perma-
nent international council"; and in the meanwhile to set up an Ameri-
can-British commission to deal with numerous problems "of joint im-
mediate interest."
For the rest the agreement consists merely of an impressive but
indirect affirmation of selected principles. The phrases in which these
principles are expressed are so safeguarded and their exposition so
intertwined that it is impossible to decide whether in practice they
would prove to be merely new language for the defense of national
rights or a new basis of international compromise. The signatory gov-
ernments promise that they will "direct their efforts" to secure the
effective observance of these principles by parties unxamed-presum-
ably the oil companies and governments that they can influence or
control.
The principles endorsed are a bid for acceptance of enlightened
leadership. They are an attempt to provide a basis for the manage-
ment of various types of difficulties over oil that have troubled inter-
national relations.
The first difficulty of which cognizance is taken arises from the fact
that most countries are dependent for their oil on external sources of
supply. This has sometimes caused fear and resentment. The de-
pendent countries are subject to anxiety over the possibility of lacking
supplies or having to pay more for them than others.
The agreement attempts to quiet this anxiety, during peace time at
least. It affirms that oil should be accessible in international trade to
all countries on a "competitive and non-discriminatory basis." This
is a pledge that dependent nations will not be exploited. It is not,
however, an unqualified pledge of basic equality of position. Countries
having oil within their own territories would retain the right to reserve
it for their own use. Individual companies, operating anywhere, would
presumably still be able to reserve their own production for sale through
their own distributing facilities; they would not be required to offer
their production for sale to all possible buyers, a matter of little sig-
nificance as long as there is active international competition for oil
markets.
Faithful observance of the declared principle would extend and
strengthen the practices of commercial equality; it would lessen the
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chance that dependent Countries would have to pay excessive prices
for oil because of monopoly, marketing arrangements or the pressure
of foreign governments. But it would not place all countries in a posi-
tion of equality in the event of shortage or war. Nor would it change
the economic fact that some countries would have to continue to pay
for their imported supplies wholly with foreign currencies while other
countries would not need to.
The second difficulty taken into account is the suspicion of oil com-
panies that rival foreign interests are conspiring to injure them. Some-
times these suspicions have had no justification, sometimes little,
sometimes much. These are imparted to and shared by governments.
They generate mistrust and stimulate (or provide a pretext for) the
wish to extend political influence over the territories containing the oil.
The signatories affirm their intention to respect each other's valid
concession contracts and acquired rights and to refrain from direct
or indirect interference with either. If this pledge were honestly ob-
served, relations between the oil interests of different countries-
particularly between those of the United States and Great Britain-
would be tranquilized. It would lessen the likelihood of political crises
connected with the protection of oil rights.
Thirdly, the agreement takes heed of the struggle between oil inter-
ests for the acquisition of new exploration and development rights. It
recognizes that groups (sometimes entirely on their own and sometimes
aided by their governments) have tried to secure exclusive rights over
large fields or areas. The pattern of controversy over this question was
drawn in a vigorous contest with Great Britain and the Netherlands
in the early twenties to prevent what was judged by American interests
to be a deliberate plan to exclude them from many oil-bearing areas.
More recently there have been many similar under-cover disputes
about opportunities in the Middle East.
The agreement would obligate its signatories so to direct their efforts
that "with regard to the acquisition and exploration and development
rights the principle of equal opportunity shall be respected." This
pledge, even if staunchly upheld, would be a starting point, but little
more, for the settlement of disputed situations. Would it mean that
the signatories must compel their nationals to refuse a grant of exclu-
sive opportunity freely offered? Would it mean that they would have
to join in persuading another country to admit into its territories-
even though it might not wish to do so-the oil enterprise of a country
that it fears? Would it mean that if the interests of one country are
in a position to out-bid those of another for the whole of an oil oppor-
tunity that there must still be a division? Or is it intended rather to
favor a division of opportunity among different countries to enter into
oil development somewhere in the world rather than in each and every
area? Should countries already controlling large resources hold back
in their attempts to acquire additional ones?
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These questions illustrate the difficulties of interpretation in apply-
ing the principle of equal opportunity. Yet importance attaches to its
affirmation at this time. It could be the doctrinal preparation for
compromise and moderation on the part of each and every country
in its search for oil reserves.
It should be observed in this connection that the signatory govern-
ments would not be obligated under the agreement to permit foreign
interests to develop oil within their own territories. The right to main-
tain a closed door is left undisturbed. The theory of equality of oppor-
tunity begins abroad and not at home. This limitation, it may be
surmised, might be given up by the United States and Great Britain
were other countries willing to do likewise. But how many countries
are ready to obligate themselves by international agreement to grant
foreign enterprise equal rights with their own nationals to develop and
sell oil within their borders? The ideas of many seem to be turned the
other way.
The fourth main problem considered in the agreement is the fear of
countries that grant concessions to foreign groups that they may be
unfairly exploited. Nations are easily incited to the belief that they
are being cheated by foreign interests, and oil companies seek large
profits to offset large outlays and risks. At present a mutually ac-
ceptable basis seems to have been found between the large oil com-
panies engaged in foreign operations and the local governments with
which they deal. There are no grave outstanding disputes in this field.
But with the tides of nationalism running strong such disputes may
recur. The general principle expressed in the agreement suggests the
possible development of an international standard of judgment of
rights and obligations.
The agreement, in short, is little more than a treatise om policy. Perhaps
this is all that any negotiators could have accomplished at tle time.
They had to recognize that half a hundred countries would ultimately
be concerned in one way or another with the rules that were formu-
lated, and knowledge of what might be generally acceptable was lack-
ing. An invitation to further discussion may have seemed to be the
advisable limit of effort. Then, too, as already observed, the American
representatives were in the dark in regard to the extent to which the
American government could give effect to any obligation it might as-
sume. Finally, there was no clear prospect of prolonged peace to em-
bolden and encourage. The negotiators came together as spokesmen
for countries which still believed that they had to rely primarily on
their own strength and strategy for defense, and on close bargaining
for fair economic opportunity. They wanted to avoid disputes over
1. The text of the agreement, as it appeared in (1945) 13 DEP'T OF STATz BULL. 481,
is printed as an Appendix to this article.
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oil and wished all nations to benefit by their action, but they were not
prepared to take any strategic risks, or lessen any acquired advantage.
An attempt to foresee how this treatise on policy would operate in
practice is handicapped by uncertainty as to the import of the clause
in Article I which makes its constituent elements (the group of affirmed
principles) "subject always to considerations of military security ......
Would this mean that each national government would consider itself
free to influence or dictate the policies of oil enterprises under its con-
trol whenever it seemed important to do so? Governments have not
agreed upon international control of any branch of military prepara-
tion, nor have they as yet devised any international arrangement for
the enforcement of peace to which each is prepared to trust its safety
and its destiny. And oil in wartime is a military weapon of primary
importance. Therefore it was hardly to be expected that the American
and British governments would in this preliminary accord restrict
their right to use the oil resources they controlled to the best military
advantage. But as long as the reservation is there, rivalry between
countries for control of oil supply is likely to continue, no matter how
satisfactory the other principles affirmed may prove to be. The needs
of military security are elastic, and each government applies its own
measuring stick.
Such in brief summary are the main principles that the American
and British governments proposed to present to others as a basis for
international order in oil. Texts such as this-mere mosaics of prin-
ciple---may be easily ignored unless some special authority is consti-
tuted to keep the nations reminded of their pledge. Furthermore,
since the terms of agreement are extremely general, numberless ques-
tions of observance, interpretation and application can be foreseen,
The ordinary process of discussion between governments will hardly
be satisfactory for these purposes.
Therefore the agreement contemplates the establishment of an
international petroleum commission. But unfortunately it does not
assign to that commission enough authority to assure that its tasks
can be effectively performed.
IV
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
The agreement provides that, pending the negotiation of a general
international agreement, the American and British governments would
establish a joint commission upon which each would have three mem-
bers. This commission is assigned only the most tenuous of responsi-
bilities and no power. It is granted the right to consider problems of
mutual interest, to study the international petroleum trade and its
dislocations, to report on the orderly correlation of supply and de-
mand, arid to "make such additional reports as may be appropriate
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for achieving the purpose of this agreement and for the broader gen-
eral understanding of the problems of the international petroleum
trade."
If the signatories insist that the commission confine itself strictly
to the duties assigned it would be a licensed source of statistics and of
comment, nothing more. It might or might not be permitted also to
report-perhaps even to advocate-ideas as well as facts. This would
depend on the attitude of its main members and of the oil interests of
which they had to take account. Governments are likely to discourage
the circulation of recommendations they dislike.
The commission is granted frail permission to strive discreetly
through its studies and reports to make the agreement effective. But
its members guard themselves against objectionable use of this per-
mission by explicitly providing "that no provision in this agreement
shall be construed to require either Government to act upon any report
or proposal made by the Commission, or to require the nationals of
either Government to comply with any report or proposal made by
the Commission, whether or not the report or proposal is approved by
that Government."
The provisions regarding the International Petroleum Commission
would seem to create no more than a continuously active conference
room, attended by a staff of experts and supplied with a multigraph
machine. Even this must not be despised or rejected. For such a
conference-room might become the birthplace of greater mutual under-
standing and the home of compromises that would help to preserve
the world's peace. But this could only occur in an atmosphere warmed
and lighted by a spirit of trust and sense of security among the great
powers.
As of this hour, these do not exist. The quarrels, first over Russian
activity in Iran, and now over the future of Palestine, have widened
every fissure of fear. Each of the three great powers has moved to
protect the interest of its nationals in oil against the resistance of the
others, and possible disturbance by local rulers or groups. The U.S.S.R.
has imposed its demands for concessions upon Iran. Soviet sympathiz-
ers and other elements hostile to Britain in the Middle East are hinder-
ing-or threatening-the great Anglo-Iranian enterprise. Or so the
British government professes as it moves its regiments into new posi-
tions in Iraq, and placates the Arabs with the misery of the Zionists.
The American government placates Ibn Saud with smallish loans,
while it listens attentively to larger proposals for economic develop-
ment. These events overshadow the attempt to establish an interna-
tional standard of rights and obligations, an international scheme of
order in oil. But they also show that it is essential that the attempt
be carried forward.
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APPENDIX
ANGLO-AMERICAN PETROLEUM AGREEMENT
Preamble: The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whose Nationals hold, to a
substantial extent jointly, rights to explore and develop petroleum resources in other coun-
tries, recognize:
1. That ample supplies of petroleum, available in international trade to meet increas-
ing market demands, are essential for both the security and economic well.being of nations;
2. That for the foreseeable future the petroleum resources of the world are adequate
to assure the availability of such supplies;
3. That the prosperity and security of all nations require the efficient and orderly
development of the international petroleum trade;
4. That the orderly development of the international petroleum trade can best be
promoted by international agreement among all countries interested in the petroleum trade,
whether as producers or consumers.
The two Governments have therefore decided, as a preliminary measure to the calling
of an international conference to consider the negotiation of a multilateral petroleum agree-
ment, to conclude the following agreement.
Article I:
The signatory Governments agree that the international petroleum trade in all its
aspects should be conducted in an orderly manner on a worldwide basis with due regard
to the considerations set forth in the preamble, and within the framework of applicable laws
and concession contracts. To this end and subject always to considerations of military
security and to the provisions of such arrangements for the preservation of peace and pre-
vention of aggression as may be in force, the signatory Governments affirm the following
general principles with respect to the international petroleum trade:
(A) That adequate supplies of petroleum, which shall in this agreement mean crude
petroleum and its derivatives, should be accessible in international trade to the Nationals
of all countries on a competitive and nondiscriminatory basis;
(B) That, in making supplies of petroleum thus accessible in international trade, the
interests of producing countries should be safeguarded with a view to their economic ad.
vancement.
Article II:
In furtherance of the purposes of this agreement, the signatory Governments will so
direct their efforts:
(A) That all valid concession contracts and lawfully acquired rights shall be respected
and that there shall be no interference directly or indirectly with such contracts or rights,
(B) That with regard to the acquisition of exploration and development rights the
principle of equal opportunity shall be respected;
(C) That the exploration for and development of petroleum resources, the construc-
tion and operation of refineries and other facilities, and the distribution of petroleum shall
not be hampered by restrictions inconsistent with the purposes of this agreement.
Article III:
1. With a view to the wider adoption of the principles embodied in this agreement,
the signatory governments agree that as soon as practicable they will propose to the gov-
ernments of all interested producing and consuming countries the negotiation of an inter-
national petroleum agreement which inter-alia would establish a permanent international
petroleum council.
2. To this end the signatory governments agree to formulate at an early date plans
for an international conference to negotiate such a multilateral petroleum agreement. They
1188 [Vol. 55 :1174
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN OIL AGREEMENT
will consult together and with other interested governments with a view to taing whatever
action is necessary to prepare for the proposed conference.
Article IV:
1. Numerous problems of joint immediate interest to the signatory governments
with respect to the international petroleum trade should be discussed and resolved on a co-
operative interim basis if the general petroleum supply situation is not to deteriorate.
2. With this end in view, the signatory governments agree to establish an interna-
tional petroleum commission to be composed of six members, three members to be appointed
immediately by each government. To enable the commission to maintain close contact with
the operations of the petroleum industry, the signatory governments will facilitate full and
adequate consultation with their nationals engaged in the petroleum industry.
3. In furtherance of and in accordance with the purposes of this agreement, the
commission shall consider problems of mutual interest to the signatory governments and
their nationals, and with a view to the equitable disposition of such problems it shall be
charged with the following duties and responsibilities:
(A) to study the problems of the international petroleum trade caused by dislocations
resulting from war;
(B) to study past and current trends in the international petroleum trade;
(C) to study the effects of changing technology upon the international petroleum
trade;
(D) to prepare periodic estimates of world demands for petroleum and of the cupplie3
available for meeting the demands, and to report as to means by which such demands and
supplies may be correlated so as to further the efficient and orderly conduct of the interna-
tional petroleum trade;
(E) To make such additional reports as may be appropriate for achieving the pur-
poses of this agreement and for the broader general understanding of the problems of the
international petroleum trade.
4. The Commission shall have power to regulate its procedure and shall establIh ouch
organization as may be necessary to carry ogt its functions under this agreement. The
expenses of the Commission shall be shared equally by the signatory governments.
Article V:
The signatory governments agree:
(A) That they will seek to obtain the collaboration of the governments of other pro-
ducing and consuming countries for the realization of the purposes of this agreement, and
to consult with such governments in connection with activities of the Commission;
(B) That they will assist in making available to the Commission such information as
may be required for the discharge of its function.
Article VI:
The signatory governments agree:
(A) That the reports of the Commission shall be published unless in any particular
case either government decides otherwise;
(B) That no provision in this agreement shall be construed to require either govern-
ment to act upon any report or proposal made by the Commission, or to require the na-
tionals of either government to comply with any report or proposal made by the Commis-
sion, whether or not the report or proposal is approved by that government.
Article VII:
The signatory governments agree:
(A) That the general purpose of this agreement is to facilitate the orderly develop-
ment of the international petroleum trade, and that no provision in this agreement, vith
the exception of Article II, is to be construed as applying to the operation of the domestic
petroleum industry within the country of either government;
19461 1189
1190 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.55:1174
(B) That nothing in this agreement shall be construed as impairing or modifying
any law or regulation, or the right to enact any law or regulation, relating to the importa-
tion of petroleum into the country of either government;
(C) That, for the purposes of this article, the word "country" shall mean
(1) In relation to the Government of the United Kingdom of.Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom, those British colonies, overseas territorieq, pro-
tectorates, protected states, and all mandated territories administered by that govern-
ment and
(2) In relation to the Government of the United States of America, the continental
United States and all territory under the jurisdiction of the United States, lists of which,
as of the date of this agreement, have been exchanged.
Article VIII:
This agreement shall enter into force upon a date to be agreed upon after each govern-
ment shall have notified the other of its readiness to bring the agreement into force and
shall continue in force until three months after notice of termination has been given by
either government or until it is superseded bp the international petroleum agreement con-
templated in Article III.
